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Viewing cable 10TBILISI203, GEORGIA: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags `#cablegate` and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. `#10TBILISI203`.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
10TBILISI203	2010-02-18 05:28	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Tbilisi

Appears in these articles:

<http://rusrep.ru/article/2010/12/07/saakashvili/>

VZCZCXRO6408
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHFW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHSI #0203/01 0490528
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 180528Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2884
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0082
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0046
RUEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 000203

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [OTRA](#) [QVIP](#) [AF](#) [RS](#) [GG](#)
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
HOLBROOK'S VISIT

Classified By: Ambass...

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 000203 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [OTRA](#) [QVIP](#) [AF](#) [RS](#) [GG](#)

1. (S) Summary. Georgia is calmer and more stable than at any time since the war, but those improvements are far from durable. A palpable sense of optimism and a sense of progress are evident. Fears that Georgia will remain in the shadows of its past are still present, but the government and society are still motivated by the lure of Euro-Atlantic integration. The upcoming deployment to Afghanistan is arguably the most visible example of President Saakashvili's continued determination to anchor Georgia in the West.

2. (C) Despite the substantial commitment Georgia has made to Q4. (C) Despite the substantial commitment Georgia has made to the effort in Afghanistan, the training program -- the Georgian Deployment Program-ISAF (GDP-ISAF) -- has been in progress since September 1, 2009. Training includes training in various skills and knowledge areas, such as combat, logistics, and administrative support.

3. (C) Whether they make the connection explicit or not, the Georgians see their contributions to Afghanistan as a down payment on their admission to the European Union. The training program is designed to prepare Georgia for its role in the European Union's military operations in Afghanistan.

4. (C) It is hard to overestimate the extent to which an intense climate of insecurity permeates Georgian society and political culture. Russia's influence in Georgia is still strong, and the government is trying to maintain a balance between its Western partners and its Russian allies.

5. (C) The immediate security environment has stabilized, with fewer incidents along the administrative boundaries. Shootings and explosions are still occurring, but they are becoming less frequent.

6. (C) A maturing Georgian policy on the territories reflects growing recognition that there is no short-term - or military - path to reintegration with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia and Russia disagree profoundly over the status of these territories.

7. (SBU) Even in Abkhazia, however, the underlying situation remains fundamentally unstable. Georgia and Russia disagree profoundly over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

8. (SBU) The Saakashvili-led United National Movement (UNM) continues to hold a constitutional majority in Parliament, and its current poll results show that it remains the largest party in the country.

9. (SBU) The government has made some tangible democratic progress in a number of areas, including passing a new Constitution in a number of areas.

10. (SBU) Opposition leaders, representing parties both inside and outside of Parliament, generally urge the United States and international community to support Georgia's efforts to maintain its independence and sovereignty.

11. (SBU) Georgian media at present reflect the polarized political environment in the country, largely divided into pro-government and pro-opposition.

12. (SBU) While official relations between Russia and Georgia remain contentious, the two governments reached a preliminary agreement in December 2009 to increase military supplies from Russia to Georgia.

13. (C) Georgia is also concerned by a significant increase in military supplies from Russia to Armenia planned for 2010 primarily via overflight routes.

14. (S) Georgia is also trying to manage its relationship with Iran. Georgia agrees with many of our concerns about Iran's policies, and has been working to improve relations.